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Abstract
      The severe crisis  that  affected the European Monetary 
Union  has  emphasized  the  prevailing  interests  of  national 
governments and a lack of political leadership of the European 
institutions,  while  the  governance  of  the euro  area has  been 
incapable of an effective crisis management.
      The present work argues that the decisions taken in March 
2011 by the European Council, named the ‘Pact for the Euro’, 
to design a new governance of the EMU, can be considered a 
fairly significant step for the European institutions in terms of 
credibility  and  legitimacy.  This  contribution,  evaluating  the 
economic  policy  framework  set  by  the  Pact  for  the  Euro, 
underlines the need for appropriate institutions and a stronger 
attitude to cooperate among the Member States. It also stresses 
the need for transparency and a non ambiguous solution of the 
debt crisis. The major message of this work  is that Economic 
and Monetary Union must equip itself with appropriate policy 
tools to manage and resolve the crisis, creating the condition to 
improve the competitiveness of the peripheral countries of the 
euro area and fostering growth. But, at the same time, Member 
States  of  the  euro  area  and  European  institutions  must 
demonstrate greater accountability and political coherence. 
keywords: EMU, European integration, crisis management, Pact for the 
euro
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Introduction°
      The severe crisis  that affected  the European Monetary 
Union  (EMU)  has  showed  the  European  institutions  to  be 
hesitant and without a real political leardership, emphasizing, 
at  the  same  time,  the  prevailing  interests  of  national 
governments, while the governance of the euro area has been 
incapable of an effective crisis management.
      The  decisions  taken  in  March  2011 by the  European 
Council  – named the ‘Pact for the Euro’ –, to design a new 
governance of the EMU, can be considered a fairly significant 
step for the European institutions  in terms of credibility and 
legitimacy. The Pact for the Euro constitutes an attempt to give 
new and effective national budgetary rules,  crisis management 
and  resolution  principles  and  procedures,  a  wider  economic 
policy  framework  to  the  Member  States  of  the  euro  area, 
although several questions remain open.
      The  present  contribution  examines  the  debate  and the 
proposals regarding the governance of the EMU. In addition, 
the work, critically evaluating the economic policy framework 
set by the Pact for the Euro, underlines the need for appropriate 
institutions  and  a  stronger  attitude  to  cooperate  among  the 
Member  States.  The  major  message  of  this  work  is  that 
Economic  and  Monetary  Union  must  equip  itself  with 
appropriate  policy  tools  to  manage  and  resolve  the  crisis, 
whereas  Member  States  of  the  euro  area  and  European 
institutions  must demonstrate  greater  accountability  and 
political coherence. 
 ° Revised version of the paper presented at the International Workshop on 
‘Legitimacy and Efficiency in Global Economic Governance’ 06th – 07th 
May 2011 – Lecce.
I wish to thank Susanna Cafaro and David Carfì for the helpful discussions  
and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
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1. The euro area governance and the global crisis.
      The European Monetary Union is an incomplete system, as 
Eichengreen  and  von  Hagen  (1996)  made  clear,  since  it  is 
based on a monetary union without a fiscal union. This original 
Economic  and  Monetary  Union  has  been  designed  in  the 
following way. It has a common currency, the euro, but does 
not have a  significant federal budget and a form of integrated 
financial  supervision.  The  fiscal  discipline  of  the  Member 
States is based on the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which 
in practice lacks of an effective mechanism of enforcement1. 
Coordination  of  national  fiscal  policy  is  facilitated  by  the 
Eurogroup (Eurozone Financial Ministers), which has emerged 
as  a  forum for  informal  coordination.  The  system has  been 
conceived with two safeguard clauses: i) the no-bailout clause, 
which establish that national governments alone are in charge 
of their  budget and that no European government  or official 
institution  is  allowed to rescue another  eurozone member  in 
case  of  public  debt  difficulties2;  ii)  the  ECB is  barred  from 
financing public debts. 
      Banking  and  financial  market  regulations  are  left  to 
national governments, with only loose coordination, due to the 
assumption  that  financial  markets  “would  work  well”.  The 
competitiveness  policy  has  been  almost  overlooked  in  the 
institutional design of EMU.
      Despite the underlying weaknesses that have characterized 
the euro since its  inception,  the results  of  EMU governance 
1 France and Germany were the first two countries that have not respected the SGP, 
as in 2003-04 they have been lobbying to change the original SGP, to make it ‘more 
flexible’. Thus in March 2005 the European Council  has reformed the SGP in order 
to improve the implementation of the Pact in accordance with the Lisbon strategy 
and, therefore, to enlarge its targets. 
2 The  clause  really  espressed  a  ‘no-coresponsibility’  principle  for  public  debts 
(Art.125 of the Treaty). Even if any euro area country could request assistance from 
IMF.
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have been quite satisfactory until the emergence of the global 
crisis.  The  inflation  rates  of  the  entire euro  area  have  been 
close to the target of the ECB. The adoption of the euro has 
also facilitated structural reforms in the product markets3. Over 
the decade the euro area has enjoyed an high per capita income 
and  a  substantial   balance  of  the  eurozone’s  overall  trade 
account4. Furthermore, the euro has  become an important 
currency in the global monetary system, but without replacing 
the dollar as the currency of reference of the whole system; in 
fact, it has  carved a significant place over the borders of the 
euro area in the strict sense, becoming the second international 
reserve  currency after  the  dollar at  the  global  level  (Pisani-
Ferry, Posen, 2009). 
      With  the  outbreak  of  the  global  crisis  of  2008-2009, 
probably  the  worst  in  the  world  economy  since  the  1930s, 
many countries of the euro area have relied on state spending 
to drive growth, so they have recorded high deficit/GDP ratio 
and rising public debt.  The average value of deficit/GDP ratio 
for the whole eurozone was 6.8% in 2009. Moreover, most of 
the countries  have also increased their  debt,  in fact  only six 
countries out of sixteen had debt/GDP ratio less than 60% in 
20095.  But the debt situation has worsened in the euro area in 
2010 (Eurostat, 2011). The euro area’s GDP instead has been 
growing much less than budget defict and public debt. All this 
has created  deep concerns about  the fiscal sustainability and 
the credibility of European Economic and Monetary Union. In 
particular,  the member  countries  most  affected  by the crisis: 
3 Alesina, Ardagna, Galasso (2010) have highlighted this issue, but they stressed that 
the same  has not happened in the labour market.
4 Actually,  there  have  been  growing  current  account  imbalances  between  the 
countries of North and South of the euro area  over time (Holinski et al. 2010).
5 Really,  from 1980 to  2007 nearly  all  the  OECD governments  increased  their 
indebtedness ratio, this happened because short-term economic needs and electoral 
interestes prevailed over the long-term sustanaibility issues.
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Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain – the “GIPS”– have spent 
and lived beyond their means by accumulating private and/or 
public  debt  and running large  current  account  deficits.  Thus 
international  capital  markets  reacted  by  demanding  risk 
premiums for continuing holding public debt of GIPS. 
      The behavior of all these countries of course has been at 
odds with  euro  participation  and has  raised  the  issue of  the 
future existence of the euro.  As the result of that,  the vision 
about the governance of EMU and its principles have changed 
significantly,  then  a  debate has been opened on the future of 
the euro, while the crisis has clearly shown the ambiguity of 
the  institutional  architecture  and  the  lack  of  coherence  of 
European politics.
2. The decisions of EU institutions after the crisis.
      After the crisis, th institutions of the European Union  and 
individual member countries have taken a number of economic 
policy measures to start the process of adjustment and try to 
solve the difficult economic and financial situation. In spring 
2010, the EU together with the IMF have decided a program of 
financial  aids  to  help  Greece  since  the  country  was  on  the 
verge of insolvency.  To overcome the no bail-out clause the 
European Council  approved the financial  aids in the form of 
“coordinated bilateral loans” at a non-discounted interest rates6. 
Another important measure was the ECB’s “securities market 
programme” by which ECB decided to buy government debt of 
fiscally  “challenged”  countries7.  Subsequently,  also  the 
6 In  April  2010  Greece  requested  the  payment  of  the  “loans”,  that  was  to  be 
approved unanimously by the European Council. But the interest rate of the loans by 
the Members States was 5%, lower than the 7% demanded by the markets.
7 To sterilize this move the ECB conducts liquidity absorbing operations of the same 
magnitude. Effectively, the ECB is buying risky assets issued by a fiscally troubled 
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member  banks  of  the  European  System  of  Central  Banks 
started  buying  government  debt.  This  measure aimed  at 
reducing volatility in the financial  markets and at  improving 
liquidity. In practice, the ECB’s decision helped the member 
countries most affected by the crisis – the “GIPS” –  to finance 
their 2010 budget deficits.
       On 9 May 2010, the 27 Member States of European Union 
agreed  to  create  a  comprehensive  rescue  package,  a  legal 
instrument aimed at ensuring financial stability in Europe, so 
the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was started to 
give credits  to countries in financial  troubles8.   The ESFF is 
devised in the form of a special purpose vehicle (SPV) that will 
sell  bonds and  use  the  money  it  raises  to  make  loans  to 
eurozone  nations  in  need.  The  bonds  will  be  backed  by 
guarantees  given  by  the  European  Commission representing 
the whole EU, the eurozone member states, and the IMF. The 
EFSF will  sell  debt  only  after  an  aid  request  is  made  by a 
country. The EFSF will run out in 2013.
3.The debate and the proposals on the euro area crisis.
      The crisis inevitably opened a debate on the political and 
economic governance of the EMU, which has been criticized 
mainly because of the lack of crisis management and resolution 
regime, the incompleteness of the economic policy framework, 
the unclear role of the European institutions.       
governement of the eurozone and, via its sterilization operations, selling its claims 
on banks, which is equivalent of selling new assets. A move that might be viewed as  
an improper risk transfer.
8 EFSF  has  become  operative  in  August  2010.  It  bases  its  rules  of  the  crisis 
management regime on the principles and procedures of the “IMF doctrine”. The 
EFSF operates in case of unstainable fiscal policies and sovereign debt crises. Thus 
the  Greek  bail-out  was  followed  by a  €85 billion  rescue  package  for  Ireland  in 
November 2010.
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      Barry Eichengreen (2009) has correctly underlined the need 
for Europe to build out the institutions of its monetary union to 
be able to avoid similar crises in the future. After all, the Treaty 
of Lisbon of  2007  has left unchanged the  economic 
governance,  which  has  remained  incomplete  and  weak,  as 
demonstrated  by the gap between the economic policy based 
on cooperation between the  Member States,  in  which  the 
autonomy of national governments has been maintained, and a 
monetary policy common to all States adopting the euro.
      It is possible to cite some examples of inadequacy of the 
institutional  architecture.  First,  the  relationship  between  the 
Member States  of  the  euro  area  and the  EU institutions  (in 
particular the Commission, but also the European Parliament) 
is  unclearly  defined,  because  of  the  strong  interests  of  the 
Member States. Thus, national interests still prevail over  the 
interest  of  Europe  and  within  the  European  institutions. 
Second,  the  European  Union  decides a  growing  number  of 
policies without  having a  policy at  European level,  while  at 
national level it has a policy without being able to decide on 
policies to  implement  it. This mismatch creates an  unstable 
environment and  a  variety  of problems.  The  effects  of  this 
mismatch are clear in the euro crisis. Third, it looks awkward 
the position of the ten Member States of non-euro area, who sit 
in the European Council but do not express themselves on the 
issues  concerning  the  euro  area. Although such  decisions 
influence  as  well  the  non  euro  area  members.  There  is, 
therefore,  a  problem  of  transparency  and  legitimacy  in  the 
decision process at institutional level. 
      Fiscal policy is another controversial point. The original sin 
of  fiscal  policy  in  the  euro  area  is  the  weakness  of  its 
framework of coordination  between the Member  States.  The 
SGP lacks of binding rules that make its enforcement effective; 
moreover the system revealed scarce transparency.  However, 
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there is  a general  agreement  on the goal to  maintain budget 
discipline in each country in the medium and long term (fiscal 
sustainability),  but  with enough flexibility  to  handle cyclical 
adjustments in the short term.
      There are some specific proposals on fiscal policy like that 
of  Burda  and  Gerlach9,  who  suggest  a  new  SGP  that 
significantly increases fiscal transparency through a creation of 
an independent committee of fiscal experts (a “Fiscal Stability 
Board”). Fatás and Mihov10 also agree on the crucial role of an 
independent institution (i.e. a fiscal policy council) to monitor 
and enforce the national fiscal policy.  Weber (2010), instead, 
is against any discretionaty decison concerning the sanctions. 
He  suggests  to  install  a  system  of  automatic  sanctions.  In 
addition, Weber argues that it is not sufficient to focus on the 
budget  deficit  alone,  as  was  done  in  the  past;  it  is  also 
necessary to place more emphasis on the level of national debt.
      Another important issue is the role of the banking system. 
The crisis in the euro area could be less severe, if the banks had 
been strong enough and not interconnected with the sovereign 
debt11. Thus many scholars  have argued that the main causes 
of  the  crisis  have  been  the  increasing  debt  and  the  serious 
difficulties of  the  banking  system,  that  are  inevitably 
intertwined. The fragility of banks and its interconnectedness 
with the debt crisis created a severe macroeconomic problem. 
During the crisis the governance of the euro area revealed the 
lack of a coordinated banking policy, which, on the opposite, is 
crucial for the crisis management. Moreover, «banking policy 
failed  to  provide  capital  cushions  large  enough  to  absorb  a 
GIPS  debt  crisis  without  putting  the  core  nations’  banking 
9 Burda, Gerlach in Baldwin et al. (2010, pp.65-68).
10 Fatás, Mihov in Baldwin et al. (2010, pp.69-72).
11 Banks of the North countries of euro area (especially France and Germany) are 
largely exposed to the peripheral countries.
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systems at  risk» (Baldwin and Gros in Baldwin et  al.  2010, 
p.16). Thus an important economic policy target to avoid crises 
is to maintain stability of banking system.
      An additional relevant point is that the crisis has exposed 
flaws in the peer review process, which put disproportionate 
emphasis  on fiscal  discipline.  At  the same time no one was 
paying  attention  to  excessive  home  consumption  and  to  the 
current account deficits, due to the false convergence between 
bond yields post EMU launch, which left the “GIPS” countries 
borrowing at rates little higher than Germany, leading to large 
speculative  inflows,  higher  wages  and  a  loss  of 
competitiveness.
      But a major reason why the global financial crisis struck 
the euro area severely was that it  coincided with the lack of 
appropriate policy tools to manage the crisis and a period of 
weak political  leadership which has made crisis management 
even harder.
      From Bruegel, Pisani Ferry (2010) has argued that it is 
necessary  to  reformulate  the  economic  policy  framework 
considering  also  the  problems  of  competitiveness,  of  trade 
imbalances  and  of  low  and  uneven  growth  inside  the 
eurozone12.  At  the  same  time  Gianviti  et  al.  (2010)  have 
supported the idea that the euro area needs a formal mechanism 
for  dealing  with  sovereign-debt  crises  in  an  effective  and 
predictable  way.  They  start  from  the  consideration  the  EU 
members  have  agreed  to  cooperate  through  supranational 
institutions within a common legal framework. Gianviti and his 
colleagues  have  proposed  the  creation  of  a  European  Crisis 
12 Moreover,  a  policy  regime  is  complete  if  it  provides  for  how to  behave   in 
different  conditions (in  good times and in times of bad times).  Pisani-Ferry and 
Sapir (in Pisani-Ferry, Posen 2009, p.71) already argued that the qualities that are  
expected  from  a  policy  system  in  cisis  times  are  clearly  different  from  those 
expected from the same system in normal times.
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Resolution  Mechanism  (ECRM),13 established  by  a  treaty, 
containing  rules  for  the   provision of  financial  assistance  to 
euro area countries as an element in resolving the crisis, but 
also procedures between a sovereign debtor with unsustainable 
debt  and  its  creditors  to  find  an  agreement  on  debt 
restructuring. The ECMR acknowledges the possibility of the 
default of a government on its debt; this possibility of default is 
a  warning to  creditors,  so that  they will  differentiate  among 
sovereign debt issuers.
       Gros and Mayer (2010) made another proposal which is 
similar. They suggested the creation of a European Monetary 
Fund  aimed  at  financing  a  mechanism  for  sovereign  debt 
resolution. This European Moneraty Fund  should represent the 
blueprint of an orderly sovereign default mechanism. It would 
contribute decisively to release the ECB from her role as a bad 
bank and to let the debtor countries and the creditors participate 
in the costs of sovereign default according to the costs-by cause 
principle (Belke, 2010). 
        Among the proposals for a new governance of the EMU, 
there is  the idea of creating a common or centralized public 
debt instrument,  establishing a single issuer of sovereign debt. 
A European government bond  (‘Eurobond’) jountly issued by 
the  euro  area  Member  States,  if  is  appropriately  designed, 
could  contribute  to  fiscal  stability  and  offer  significant 
advantages in terms of efficiency to the issuing governments of 
the euro area, but also to investors and financial intermediaries. 
As Favero and Missale (2010, p.91) maintened : “A common 
Eurobond is  a  strong form of  debt  management  cooperation 
with  the  potential  of  promoting  further  market  integration, 
greater  liquidity and lower borrowing costs”.  There are may 
proposals on Eurobonds and it is possible to distinguish several 
13 Gros and Mayer (2010) made a similar proposal with the creation of a European 
Monetary Fund aimed at financing a mechanism for sovereign debt resolution.
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types of Eurobond14. A recent porposal15 to issue the Eurobond 
was conceived to restructure the public debts of the Member 
States of the euro area and also to reduce speculative attacks. In 
this way the Eurobond can contribute to the financial stability. 
This stability,  in turn, would facilitate the creation of a deep 
and liquid market for European sovereign bonds, that would be 
able to compete with U.S. Treasury bonds16. In this proposal, 
these  European  government  bonds  should  be  issued  by  an 
European  Debt  Agency  (EDA),  which  is  also  intended  to 
substitute the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)17.  
    The proposals concerning a European Monetary Fund and a 
common European bond can be regarded as very sensible and 
can be viewed with favor.    
                                                     
5. Towards a new governance of the EMU
      
       The persistence of the crisis has pushed the euro area 
countries to take action. The European Council has therefore 
taken two relevant decisions in March 2011. The first is a new 
competitiveness pact, called “A Pact for the Euro”, the second 
is the agreement  regarding how to finance a permanent euro 
area  rescue fund,  the European Stability  Mechanism (ESM). 
The  agreement  on  the  ESM,  which  implied  a  small  Treaty 
change allowing for the use of the simplified treaty revision 
14 For a discussion on the different type of Eurobonds see Favero, Missale (2010).
15 The  proposal   by   Jean  Claude  Junker  and  Giulio  Tremonti  appeared  in  the 
Financial  Times on  December  5th 2010.  Other  proposals  are  made  by  Alberto 
Quadrio Curzio (2011), Lorenzo Bini Smaghi (2011).
16 Quadrio Curzio (2011, p.283).
17 EDA should buy bonds of Member States when they are issued, but also in the 
secondary market; in this way this agency replaces the market as a creditor.  EDA, 
unlike normal investors, would not be asking a risk premium to the securities until 
maturity.
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procedure18, is part of a wider deal on measures to ensure the 
stability of the euro area and improve economic coordination.
      The European Commision, already in 2010, stated that 
there are two other important objectives of economic policy in 
addition  to the  price  stabilty and fiscal  discipline:  one  is 
financial  stability,  which  has become  evident and necessary 
after the crisis,  the other is the avoidance of –  or at least to 
contain  –  macroeconomic  imbalances.  The  recent  measures, 
taken  in  March  2011,  try  to  complete  the  economic  policy 
framework in terms of objectives and instruments.
       The Pact for the Euro, which has to do with economic 
governance  per se, aims to achieve a better economic policy 
coordination leading to a higher degree of convergence.  The 
Pact  “focuses  primarily  on  areas  that  fall  under  national 
competence  and  are  key  for  increasing  competitiveness  and 
avoiding harmful imbalances” (European Council, 2011). The 
goals of the Pact for the Euro are: fostering competitiveness, 
fostering employment, contributing further to the sustainability 
of public finances, reinforcing financial stability.
        In addition, the Pact includes important commitments to 
prevent  crisis  that  regard  legislative  measures  to  strengthen 
euro area budget rules. The new regime will take into account 
the debt ratio and implicit  liabilities19.  The Pact also make it 
harder  for  politicians  to  veto  fines  imposed on recalcitrant 
debtors.   A  positive  aspect  included  in  this  new  economic 
policy  framework  is  the  recognition  that  not  all  crises  are 
18 The simplified treaty  revision procedure requires that all 27 EU countries agree.
19 So that a country with an oversized banking sector will have to factor in potential 
rescue costs.
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rooted in a lack of budgetary discipline. It is now agreed that 
financial  stability  and  macroeconomic  stability  also  matter. 
The  Pact  for  the  Euro  commits  the  euro  partners  to  closer 
economic  co-ordination  and  to  a  series  of  new  austerity 
measures, including close monitoring of pension schemes, and 
limits on public sector wage increases. As it stands, however, 
the  Pact  for  the  Euro  remains  an  agreement  on  principles 
without a real enforcement20. 
      Since the Pact for the Euro focuses on competitiveness and 
envisages an EMU which does not become a transfer union, 
Carfì  and Schilirò  (2010, 2011) have suggested an approach 
based on coopetition. First, they have pointed out the primary 
role of competitiveness in determining growth and the relation 
between  competitiveness  and  macroeconomic  imbalances. 
Carfì  and  Schilirò  have  argued  that  to  overcome 
macroeconomic  imbalances  it  is  necessary  a  medium  term 
strategy for competitiveness and growth, based on innovative 
investments  and  a  process  of  structural  change  of  the 
production  system.  Within  this  broad  strategy,  trade 
imbalances,  in  particular,  can  be  addressed  through  a 
coopetitive  strategy,  which  implies  a  cooperative  attitude 
aiming at growth among the member countries of the euro area, 
despite their divergent interests. The coopetitive strategy will 
provide a  win-win solution to the actors of the game and can 
constitute a new macroeconomic policy tool to help solving the 
imbalances problems and contribute to overcome the economic 
crisis in a medium-run perspective.
      The  measures  concerning  the  crisis  resolution,  which 
encompass the creation of a permanent euro area rescue fund –
the  European  Stability  Mechanism  (ESM)  –  contribute 
significantly to outline the new governance of the EMU.
20 Germany and the President of ECB, Trichet, backed a more binding version that  
included the possibility of sanctions for violators.
14
       First, the SGP was improved and hardened, but this new 
SGP does not dispose of any mechanism to override national 
sovereignity. Therefore it become a complement to goverment 
insolvency mechanism. Second, it is known that the no bail-out 
clause  to  limit  the  cooperative  attitude  among  the  member 
countries  of  the  European  Economic  Monetary  Union, 
established in the Maastricht  Treaty,  was made to  stress  the 
individual responsibility of the governments and to emphasize 
the  strong  faith  in  the  market  capacity  to  overcome  any 
difficulties. This clause revealed itself too rigid and irrealistic 
in crisis time. Similarly, the new rules of the EMU governance 
have  transformed  the  old  no-bailout  clause  into  another 
irrealistic rule concerning the crisis resolution. The leaders of 
the  euro  area  committed  themselves  to  increase  the  lending 
capacity of the current rescue fund, the EFSF21, making it able 
to bail out several eurozone countries if the debt crisis were to 
continue  to  spread22.  They also established the creation  of a 
permanent post-2013 fund – the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) – that will be able to lend up to €500bn, likely to be 
achieved through guarantees from triple-A states. In the face of 
German and Dutch resistance,  the leaders  chose to set  some 
limits.  The fund will be able to buy bonds, but only directly 
from a struggling government and only after that government 
agrees  to  austerity  measures.  However  these  new  financial 
facilities can be only used in a narrow set of circumstances23, 
which limit their application and convenience for the struggling 
countries.
21 From about €250bn to its full, headline level of €440bn.
22 Greece  and  Ireland  were  the  two  troubled  eurozone  countries  that asked  the 
European Union for emergency support to ensure that they could continue to finance 
their debt. Portugal has become the third in April 2011.
23 The fund will   provide assistance only as a last resort,  by unanimity and with 
harsh conditionality.
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      The agreement reached by eurozone’s leaders was therefore 
a  typical  political  compromise.  Unfortunately,  compromise 
could  not  necessarily  work  in  a  debt  crisis.  There  are,  in 
essence, two ways to solve a debt crisis: through a bail-out or 
through  default.   The  leaders  of  the  euro  area  got  itself  an 
arrangement  that  represents  only  an  emergency  facility  and 
constitutes  a  scarsely  credible  intermediate  solution  between 
bail-out and default.
     To understand this agreement, it is important to focus on 
some technical aspects of the financial rescue mechanisms. The 
current EFSF will run out in 2013. It gives credits to countries 
in  trouble  and  may  soon  buy  their  bonds  on  the  primary 
markets as they rank on the same terms with everybody else’s 
investments.  On  the  whole  that  means,  should  the  country 
default,  everybody gets hit equally.  Creditor nations, such as 
France  and  Germany,  would  not  allow a  default  of  a  GIPS 
country (say Greece) until 2013, because it would be a political 
disaster  for  their  governments.  In  2013,  the  new ESM will 
replace the EFSF. The crucial  difference between the two is 
that its credits will be senior to those of private investors. The 
idea is to make default possible, with only a moderate risk to 
the  budget  of  the  creditor  nations.  By  2013,  the  European 
banks should be in a better position than today to absorb big 
losses,  or so one hopes,  therefore there could be the  end of 
crisis.  Unfortunately  financial  markets  follow  a  different 
reasoning.  What  has been happening is  that  forward-looking 
investors see through this scheme and correctly assess the risk 
of  a  future default,  also for  existing bonds.  They know that 
once  a  country  defaults,  old  and  new bonds  will  be  treated 
alike.  Thus  policymakers  in  Germany  or  France  are  just  as 
unlikely to push for a managed default in 2013 as they are now. 
In 2013 the crisis will not be ended, so  the game of lending at 
high interest rates in exchange of austerity plans will continue, 
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until  the  debtor  country’s  economy collapses  under  its  debt 
burden, at which point the default will be inevitable and very 
unpleasant24. 
      All debt crises are politically difficult to solve because they 
involve  to  make choices  about  who will  ultimately  bear  the 
burden of  the accumulated  debt,  between the borrowers,  the 
lenders and the taxpayers. The comprehensive solution to the 
euro area crisis cannot avoid some difficult, but inevitable and 
transparent,  political  choices. A  reasonable  and  coherent 
solution could be, for instance, to accept the principle of a bail-
out,  not  through  cross-country  transfers,  but  by  means  of 
effective  reforms  to  enable  the  countries  to  restructure  their 
economies and  of a common European bond that replaces all 
national debt25. 
       Despite the step forward made by the European Council in 
March  2011  with  its  measures  on  crisis  resolution, 
competitiveness. some problems remain unsoved. First, there is 
still  some  ambiguity  in  the  economic  policy  framework, 
regarding, for instance, fiscal sustainabilty and the new SGP, 
but also the weight and the role of the national governements 
relative  to  European  institutions.  Second,  there  is  an  urgent 
need  to  expedite  the  resolution  of  the  banking  crisis.  Many 
European  banks  still  have  in  their  balance  sheet  too  many 
“toxic assets” and risky sovereign bonds.   Third,  an equally 
important
 point  is  that  the  European  authorities  must  sort  out  state 
insolvency cases from illiquidity cases (Greece is likely to find 
itself insolvent), since this lack of clearness between liquidity 
crisis and solvency problem is putting at risk the entire system. 
Fourth, there is the issue of exit strategy for the ECB that needs 
24 Probably the  current policymakers may be no longer in office by then and can 
blame therefore their successors for the mess. 
25 The idea of Eurobonds is strongly supported by Quadrio Curzio (2010, 2011). 
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to  know  how it  will  get  rid  of  the  peripheral  bonds  on  its 
balance  sheet26.  Fifth,  the  question  of  how  the  euro  area 
periphery will achieve debt sustainability, since there is still no 
serious answer to the problem of sustainability of public debt 
yet.  Finally,  the euro area needs a strategy to revive growth 
particularly  in  southern  Europe.  As  I  already  argued,  a 
coopetitive  strategy  can  be  part  of  this  wide  strategy  for 
growth.
Conclusions.
      The new approach of the governance of EMU, based on the 
Pact for the Euro, is  a partial answer to the persistent crisis of 
the euro area. But the provided solutions constitute significant 
corrections as regards some early weaknesses.
        So several issues remain open. This contribution has 
underlined  the  need  of  a  greater  cooperation  among  the 
member  countries  to  implement  the  economic  policies,  a 
coopetitive strategy to face some macroeconomic imbalances, a 
more  effective  fiscal  policy  regime.  It  has  also  stressed  the 
need for transparency, accountability and a clear solution of the 
debt crisis. In addition, it is very important the good health of 
the banking system and the sustainability of the debt burden of 
the peripheral countries. But it is also crucial a medium term 
strategy  for  growth  based  on  reforms  that  improve 
competitiveness of the peripheral countries of the euro area and 
that  should  help  the  economies  of  the  EMU  grow  out  of 
increased public debt.
      However, the feeling is that the European authorities still 
believe not to have governance mechanisms capable of making 
important  decisions. Besides,  the weak  and divided EU 
institutions have tax  revenues of  less  than  2%  of European 
26 The ECB holds 49 billion euros of sovereign greek bonds.
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GDP. Moreover, any major decision requires unanimity. In fact 
EU institutions follow a quite irrealistic motto which is "all for 
one and one for all",  regardless of flow, the debt position and 
transparency. Finally, the national interests are too strong and 
prevail over the European institutions.
       In conclusion, in this contribution I envisage the idea that 
if  the Economic and Monetary Union likes to survive in the 
medium-long  term,  it  will  be  necessary  that  the  European 
institutions must provide an effective crisis resolution system, 
based  on  an  European  Monetary  Fund  with  a  common 
European  bond (‘Eurobond’),  that  can  finance  the  sovereign 
debt  of  the  member  countries  and  that  can  also  finance  the 
investment in infrastructure in the EU. It is also necessary a 
better  fiscal  policy  co-ordination,  which  should  take  in 
perspective towards a fiscal union. In addition, the governance 
of the EMU must ensure more transparency,  demand greater 
accountability from member countries, make reforms to enable 
the  countries  to  restructure  their  economies,  promote  a  real 
cooperation  among  the  member  states,  without  becoming  a 
transfer union, that is, a monetary union which merely transfer 
resources.
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